| The democratic standardization which transnational organizations have adopted for their decision-making norms has struggled with that of national level since post-Cold War era. Under the bipolar hegemony, there was simple division of normative standards in transnational decision-making process depending on which side a state belonged to between free and communist camp. After collapse of bipolar system, however, the state-centric world is no longer predominant leading to emergence of complex multi-centric world of diverse such as ethnic minorities, multinational corporations and various transnational organizations, etc., and this global trend seems bound to be marked by much greater uncertainty than the one that sustained the Cold War. As this phenomenon spreads widely over the world, the large numbers of transnational organization are going further beyond the existing national democratic structures, especially in their decision-making process. Furthermore, states are increasingly subject to transnational norms to which they may have not at all or at least not specifically consented. Then fundamental questions arise here in defining where those transnational norms came from, those are seemingly underpinning democratic principles of modern transnational organizations, and how those norms are being practiced or administered by whom or certain entities. (과거 냉전시대와는 달리, 국제 기구의 의사결정 과정은 과거 미국과 소련의 양극화된 성격에서 벗어나, 현재에 이르러서는 각 지역별로 의사결정 과정에 다원화된 요구사항이 반영되고 있는 것은 사실이다. 하지만, 현재에도 최종 의사결정 단계를 확정짓는 보이지 않는 그 어떤 규범과 힘이 존재하고 있다.) Although globalization has played important roles in leading economic decentralization in external terms that the influences of traditional powerful nations are on the decrease in monopolization of world markets, their political dominance in decision-making roles still pervades over the major transnational organizations. Forinstances, the veto powers of the five permanent members in the United Nations Security Council are still predominantly being practiced and secured as the most authoritative decision-making group in relation to the global political issues. Regarding the members’ privileges, Dr. Hans Kochler, the president of International Progressive Organization, criticizes that traditional superpower hegemony needs such a representative tool with regard to the cases of international relations justifying legitimization of elite rule and excluding any participation of citizens or immature states in the decision-making process. Meanwhile, the situation in WTO is even worse. The four groups of nation called “the Quad” such as United States, the European Unions, Canada, and Japan are implicitly regarded as a key decision-maker in both external and internal issues of WTO through their pressures against other member states in the existing hierarchy designed by a nation’s income-level, so ‘the one-member-one-vote principle of equality’ in the WTO is practically blurred by the Quad’s decision-rules over the least developing countries. Moreover, a lack of both human and legal resources, and research facilities has been raised as an obstacle for those poor countries to participate in decision-makings of WTO. Thus, the Quad system of WTO, it actually inherited “the Club Model” theory from the GATT, is a useful instrument for the purpose of coalitions of the willing and able among the superpowers. In addition, the weighted voting system of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank For Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) is often backed by economic superiority infringing democratic legitimacy of transnational decision-making process. Practically, these International Financial Institutions are regarded being owned by their member-country representatives, so-called “Shareholders”, with voting and decision-making power. (비록 국제화가 세계경제의 다원화된 블록화를 형성하여 과거의 소수 엘리트 국가들의 독점을 규제하고 막고 있는 상황이 사실이지만, 실은 아직도 국제기구의 의사결정 과정에서는 그러한 소수의 국가들의 파워가 명백히 존재하고 있다. 가령, 국제무역기구 (WTO)의 중요 의사결정은 "the Quad"라 불리는 4개의 국가 - 미국, 유럽연합, 일본, 그리고 캐나다-들이 주도적으로 의사결정 과정에 관여하고, 기타 다른 경제 기구들 (GATT, IBRD, IMF)에서도 이들 국가들은 자국의 막대한 경제력을 이용하여 중요한 정책의 제안이나 의사결정에 영향을 미치고 있다.) There are another factors giving rise to undemocratic decision-making in transnational governance. Corporation governance has been focused on their negative influences on the decision-making. The CODEX Alimentarius standardization body has served providing with global foods standards and guidelines. However, now the CODEX is widely suspected with its members’ allegedly serving corporate interests. In regard to the corporation governance issues, Lee A. Tavis, professor of University of Notre Dame at MBA department, argued that the IBRD and the IMF are under influences by economic governance and those financial institutions are indirectly linked with the United Nations. Also, transparency issue of decision-making can be laid down one of negative aspect of this topic. In the European Union’s decision-making process, members of public do not have any right or instrument to complain about lobbyists’ behaviors that may significantly affects the decisions of European Parliaments. Also, the Council of Ministers’ sessions are on the while secret, and documents are not readily released.(그리고 이들 파워 엘리트 국가들의 기업들은 막대한 로비를 행사해 자신들의 이익에 반하는 정책들이나 규제들에 대해서 제제를 가하고 있는 것이 현실이다. 유럽연합의 국회에서도 이러한 로비스트들의 활동이 정책의 투명성과 공개성에 막대한 상처를 주고 있다.) Next, I am going to further researches on the substantial factors regarded as fundamental obstacles to the democratic settlement of transnational governance. The matter of to what extent the activities or norms from transnational governances can be justified under the principles of democratic legitimacy is depending on the public attitudes and responses to those norms. If the public do not favor with the norms, the governance cannot have authoritative effect over the people in terms of absence or lack of democratic legitimacy in this governance. In the state context, people may do some actions against any illegitimate governance by state organs through democratic national structures or media, etc. In transnational level, however, there is no clearly guaranteed function for global regulation against illegitimate governance of transnational organizations. Thus, transposing democracy from domestic area into transnational level seems not feasible. In this regard, Richard B. Stewart, professor of New York University, pointed out that the core problems of global regulation is disregarding of important affected domestic societal interests impacted by such regulations. Since the United States’ refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the problems of bifurcated international law-making system have been raised continually by scholars. Under the bifurcated system, the international law and the domestic law are treated two totally distinct system of law. Originally, this bifurcated system was devised to guide states to intermediate between their citizens and international orders by charging states with setting the rules for the international system. However, this system has revealed its serious dysfunctions in that it can provides any possibilities of the refusal of individual states to accede to international norms or the potential for a minority states to effectively veto a treaty. Furthermore, the US dualism, means that international law may incorporated into the U.S. federal law so it can be the law of the United States, has potential power which can violates international norms by organizing their citizens against the norm. (미국은, 자국의 산업보호를 명목으로 교토의정서의 최종 비준안 - 국제 환경 보전을 위하여 이산화탄소의 배출량을 줄이는 것에 합의하는 서명- 에 거절하였고, 미국의 연방법이 국제적 규약이나 국제법에 마찰이 생길 경우 언제든지 거부권을 행사할 수 있는 법적 장치와 기능을 가지고 있는 세계유일의 국가이다.) Meanwhile, any trials on successful settlement of deliberative democracy in transnational sphere often face challenges laid down between efficient outputs and democratic decision-making process. As long as any affairs of transnational organizations cannot fully governed by the public deliberation of their members, any form of stakeholder-democracy may be emerged by pursuing the efficiency of decision-making rather than its democratic process. The European Community, for example, is frequently considered not as a supranational institution practicing delegated normative power, but as an administrative one since the EC draws its authority from lawful transfers of normative powers from national parliaments, not from a constitutional enactment of the public. (한편, 국제기구의 의사결정 과정은 효율성과 민주적 방법에 의거한 의사결정 과정 사이에서 또 다른 마찰을 빚고 있다. 유럽연합의 국회는 유럽인들의 의사를 충분히 반영하지 못한채, 안건의 효율적인 발효와 실행에 초점을 맞추는 과정에 익숙해져 있고, 이러한 과정에서 보이지 않는 소수의 정책결정 집단들의 권위가 법의 힘을 앞서는 경우가 흔하다.) |
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